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Abstract: The emergence of oil in the political economy of Nigeria brought structural changes 
which proved difficulty for policy makers to manage. Consequently, the economy became quite 
susceptible to external shocks due to over-reliance on Oil. Therefore, the development of the 
non-oil sector had been a major national objective of succeeding governments in Nigeria. This 
paper examines restructuring efforts of the Nigerian economy, the existing promising 
opportunities in the non-oil sector to indicate lessons for less developed countries. The paper 
concludes with policy options recommendation for viable private and public sector investments 
to catalyze the development of the non-oil sector. 
1.0 Introduction 
The Nigerian economy, at 
independence in 1960, was an 
agrarian economy with agriculture 
contributing significantly both to the 
gross domestic product (GDP) and 
over exports. The mainstay products 
at that time included, inter alia, 
cocoa, rubber, palm produce (palm 
oil and kernels) from southern 
Nigeria, and groundnuts and cotton 
from the northern part. Agriculture 
also provided the bulk of domestic 
food requirements, accounting for 
over 75% of employment and 
significantly contributing to Federal 
Revenues through export taxes and 
Marketing Boards‘ surpluses. 
However, over the years public 
policy actively sought to change the 
structure of economic activities 
inherited at independence as was 
evidenced in the industrialization 
policy adopted by the government 
from the mid-1950s. The various 
National Development Plans during 
the 1946-1985 periods bore eloquent 
testimony to the grand design of 
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incumbent government in 
diversifying the economy (Obadan, 
2003). All through the years of 
development planning, however, the 
unanticipated effects of the policies 
adopted to promote import 
substitution industrialization (ISI) as 
well as their failures to achieve the 
goals were apparent. Meanwhile, the 
emergence of oil in the political 
economy of Nigeria had aided the 
sudden transition of ISI to the 
unsustainable establishment of heavy 
industries with disastrous 
consequences. The industries were 
dependent on foreign inputs, spare 
parts and foreign technical expertise 
for operations and maintenance Oil, 
which only began to be 
commercially exploited in Nigeria in 
1958, had, by 1965, started making 
appreciable contribution to fiscal 
revenues and exports and, by 1970, 
had displaced agricultural products 
as the major foreign exchange earner 
for the country.  
 
 
The structural changes that the new 
oil economy introduced in Nigeria, 
since 1970, have proved difficult for 
policy makers to manage.  A series 
of factors had conspired to create 
booms and bursts in world oil prices, 
which, in turn, created pronounced 
revenue instabilities that were alien 
when the country depended 
exclusively on agricultural exports 
for foreign exchange earnings. The 
oil booms of the 1970s came at a 
period Nigeria had limited domestic 
absorptive capacity, with the result 
that the oil windfalls financed 
consumption of foreign-produced 
goods, including new propensity for 
foreign foods, inefficient and 
unsustainable expansion of the 
public sector, and uncoordinated 
infrastructural development, 
especially urban services. The oil 
boom of the 1970s/80s also 
improved the creditworthiness of 
Nigeria (due mainly to the high level 
of accrued foreign reserves), 
permitting it to borrow massively 
from international capital markets 
from the late 1970s (see Table 1: 
Foreign Reserves & Debt Profile – 
960 – 2000).  Some of the 
borrowings were for project 
financing while others were general 
balance of payments support loans. 
This scenario actually led to the 
general view in government that 
there was bottomless treasury and, 
therefore, the need to develop the 
non-oil sectors was not a priority. 
This scenario has been variously 
described as the ‗Dutch disease‘, 
‗resource curse, or ‗the Yamani 
syndrome‘ (Soremekun.2013). The 
decline of the oil boom in the early 
1980s, however, laid bare the 
unsustainable nature of the growth 
trajectory induced by the new oil 
economy and made evident the need 
for a rethinking and redesigning of 
Nigeria‘s development typology. 
Consequently, policies were then 
pursued that relied on various 
administrative mechanisms to arrest 
the decline in the economy and 
curtail balance of payments 
disequilibrium but these proved very 
unsuccessful. In 1986, the Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP), 
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aimed at restructuring the economy, 
was recommended by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and supported by the World Bank, 
was launched. The overriding goal of 
the programme was to diversify the 
economic base of the country, by 
reducing and totally de-emphasizing 
reliance on oil production through 
the development of the non-oil 
sector. After almost three decades of 
pursuing this programme, oil 
dominance of the economy has 
continued to grow in importance 
while the other promising real 
sectors of the economy that can 
make significant contributions to 
national output remain neglected and 
undeveloped. Our objective in this 
paper is to examine the challenges 
and indicate lessons to be learnt by 
other developing countries, from the 
development of the non-oil sector in 
Nigeria. 
 
 
2.0 Current Structure of 
Production 
The structure of economic activities 
in Nigeria currently is such that 
crude account for about 40% of 
GDP, over 95% of foreign exchange 
earnings, over 70% of Federal 
government revenue (Ezirim, et al, 
2010). The contribution of 
agriculture had declined 
proportionately from the high levels 
of the 1960s although it has grown in 
absolute terms. Manufacturing, on 
the other hand, had stagnated and 
declined proportionately, reflecting 
the failure of the industrialization 
policies pursued over the years. The 
Central Bank of Nigeria 2011 report 
indicated a decline and stagnation of 
manufacturing sector: 7.9% (2009), 
7.6 % (2010) and 7.6% (2011). In 
agricultural production, cash crops 
had declined reversing the past trend 
when Nigeria‘s export trade was 
dominated largely by non-oil 
products like rubber, palm produce, 
groundnuts and cotton have 
disappeared from the export list 
(Ogunkola, et al,2008);  (see Table 
2). This reflects many years of 
inappropriate policies, including 
overvalued exchange rates, 
inefficient agricultural infrastructure 
investments, misdirected credit 
policies, bad producer pricing 
policies and inadequate producer 
support policies. The misfortunes of 
the manufacturing sector arose 
largely from its high import-
dependence for technology, 
machinery and spare parts as well as 
raw materials. Consequently, in the 
period of foreign exchange 
bottlenecks, the sector buckled. This 
also explains why the manufacturing 
sector could not survive the 
restructuring policies of SAP which 
involved trade liberalization, 
exchange rate depreciation, abolition 
of directed and subsidized credit, and 
removal of subsidies on targeted 
services provided by the 
government. Distribution and trade 
have grown but mainly concentrated 
on imported goods as local 
processing and manufacturing have 
not been expanding. Oil production 
has grown over the years, using 
foreign technology and finance, with 
the revenues accruing to the 
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government through the derivation 
from rent and royalties, petroleum 
profits tax, and government‘s share 
of crude oil sales from joint venture 
production-sharing agreements with 
international oil companies. The 
linkages of the oil industry with the 
other sectors of the economy have 
been very minimal, as the bulk of 
domestic demands for refined 
petroleum products were still met 
through importation, due to limited 
refining capacity.  Indeed, for much 
of the first decade of the 21
st
 century, 
domestic consumption of petroleum 
products was solely and wholly met 
from imported refined products in 
spite of the fact that Nigeria is the 
fifth largest OPEC country.   
 
 
3.0 History of Economic 
Diversification in Nigeria 
Diversifying the economic base of 
Nigeria has been a major 
preoccupation of policy makers since 
independence. In this regard, the 
First National Development Plan 
(1NDP) of 1962—68 stated the 
policy goal as: ―To achieve a 
modernized economy consistent with 
the democratic, political and social 
aspirations of the people‖. In 
subsequent development plans 
particularly, the Third and the Fourth 
National Development Plans (3NDP 
and 4NDP) as well as vision 
20:2020, the imperatives of a 
modernized economy that is 
diversified and competitive were re-
emphasized with strategic focus on 
securing increase in the supply of 
skilled manpower(3NDP and 
4NDP); and development of 
technology and increased 
productivity (4NDP) 
 
Sectorial objectives to achieve these 
broad national goals, intended to 
diversify the economy, were 
articulated and amply dispersed in 
the national plans in three key 
sectors: 
 
Industrial Sector, Agriculture and Oil 
and Gas: 
However, that Nigeria is still 
grappling with the issue of the 
development of the non-oil sector is 
a clear testimony to the failure of 
development planning in Nigeria. 
According to Bright (2010) a 
worrisome aspect of non-oil sector is 
the preponderance of raw 
agricultural product in the Nigeria‘s 
non-oil exports indicating lack of 
industrial capacity to process these 
outputs to higher economic value. 
Nevertheless, the national goals and 
the sectorial activities suggest 
promising opportunities for 
developing the non-oil sector in 
Nigeria. On the other hand, the 
contributory factors to the failure of 
development planning in Nigeria 
would indicate the challenges of the 
development of the non-oil sector. 
As is evident from the experience of 
Japan and Germany, the absence of 
envisioning and strategic planning 
orientation and commitment in 
Nigeria‘s development planning is a 
major reason for failure to achieve 
economic diversification. After 
thorough analyses of industrial and 
technological trends in the world 
economy, Japan and Germany after 
World War II, each decided to direct 
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domestic economic development 
away from traditional industries (that 
needed to be protected) towards high 
technology consumer industries that 
were seen as the industries of the 
future (Drucker, 1980).  Scooping 
through the contents of development 
plans of Nigeria one would see 
robust analyses of the internal 
domestic economy but shallow 
depiction of emerging global 
economic and technological trends.  
Furthermore, the plans did not utilize 
scenario planning and any evidence 
of the use of this only projected the 
continuation of the most recent 
economic trends (the most optimistic 
scenarios). But for an open economy 
like Nigeria, a more careful 
assessment of global economic 
trends was imperative because the 
bulk of the resources and forces 
crucial for plan success were 
external to the economy.  
 
 
4.0 Factors Militating Against the 
Development of the Non- Oil 
Sector 
The development of the non-oil 
sector has been a major national 
goal, expressed in the national 
development plans. Failure to 
achieve this goal is traceable to the 
factors that impeded plan 
implementation in Nigeria. Among 
these factors are the following: 
 Poor performance of the 
economy. The successful 
execution of the plans 
depended on the realization 
of the planned flows of 
resources from good 
economic performance. The 
overly optimistic projections 
of resources flows, inflows 
and internally generated, that 
characterized the plans 
proved unrealistic due to a 
variety of factors. As for 
inflows, there was a general 
shortfall in development aid 
due to stringent requirements 
for projects support by 
donors and inadequate 
capacity in projects 
preparation. Despite episodes 
of commodity booms, export 
receipts still fell below 
expectation because OPEC 
quota constraints and 
inability of the country to 
develop other export 
products. Domestic tax 
efforts could also not be 
improved due to institutional 
bottlenecks and limited real 
growth in the economy. The 
behaviour of policy makers in 
the face of shortage of 
development resources 
aggravated the effects of 
these resource shortfalls. 
Through plan distortion., 
policy makers failed to 
ensure that actual 
expenditures on priority 
sectors remained as large as 
the proportion of planned 
spending on those sectors. 
Plan implementation in 
Nigeria also portrayed  
another undesirable feature, 
namely, plan indiscipline, 
which is the practice of 
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executing projects not 
included in the plans 
(Ihimodu,1994). These were 
the hallmark of the military 
regimes that ruled the country 
for 28 years between 1966 
and 1999. 
 Inadequate executive 
capacity. According to Dean 
(1971), inadequate executive 
capacity is manifested in poor 
co-ordination among 
agencies of government; the 
failure of an agency to make 
decisions or take actions at 
the times required.; and in the 
failure to produce new 
information or to use 
information already 
available. The Nigerian 
bureaucracy did not possess 
the right quantity of 
personnel with the specific 
types of training and 
experience needed for these 
tasks. Also, the system of 
incentives that characterized 
the bureaucracy could not 
facilitate effective 
performance.  
 The dominance of 
government in economic 
activities. Two major 
developments, the political 
economy of oil and the 
indigenization programme of 
the 1970s, fostered this. The 
dominance of oil in the 
export list for Nigeria meant 
that Nigeria moved away 
from the export of a broad 
range of agricultural 
products, where about 75% 
of Nigerians participated in 
production, to a commodity 
using foreign capital and 
technology for production 
with minimal Nigerian labour 
participation. Further more, 
the manner of expenditure of 
oil revenues created 
additional problems that did 
not promote the development 
of a viable private sector. Oil 
expenditures mainly funded 
non-traded goods, urban 
infrastructures and 
government consumption 
expenditures, and this led to 
contraction in traded-goods 
sector. As the private sector 
contracted, government 
became the major source of 
wealth accumulation, turning 
politics in Nigeria into a 
―fight to capture and privatize 
an enormous power resource‖ 
(Ake, 1993). The 
indigenization programme, 
which sought to transfer the 
ownership of foreign-
controlled businesses to 
Nigerians, resulted in 
foreigners selling between 
60% and 100% of their 
ownership stakes in 
companies to Nigerians, 
depending on the technical 
nature of the enterprises. The 
predictable outcome of this 
policy was the drying up of 
foreign investment inflows 
and the resort of federal and 
state governments to external 
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borrowing to fill the resource 
gaps. This further extended 
the public sector as federal 
and state governments 
ventured into areas where 
they were not competent to 
operate. This was an 
inefficient expansion of the 
non-oil sector not only 
because of the incompetence 
of the public sector as a 
manager of commercial 
enterprises but also because 
this led to the crowding out 
of investments that that 
would have been undertaken 
by the private sector at lower 
costs. Excessive public sector 
investment in Nigeria, in turn 
bred massive corruption, 
leading to over-inflation of 
project costs. For instance, 
the Nigerian public sector 
invested US$115 billion 
between 1973 and 1990, on 
projects that the private 
sector would have completed 
with US$35 billion 
(Summers, 1992). 
 The resort to external 
commercial borrowing to 
finance balance of payments 
deficits and development 
projects created a heavy 
burden of external debt 
servicing (1982-2006) that 
did not permit adequate 
investment resources to be 
devoted to the development 
of the non-oil sector.  
 Macroeconomic Instability. 
Successive post-
independence civilian and 
military governments in 
Nigeria abandoned fiscal 
conservatism and embraced 
fiscal indiscipline. In their 
quest to expand development 
resources they created 
unsustainable fiscal deficits 
that were financed by money 
creation. This created a 
regime of high inflation, high 
interest rates and chronic 
balance of payments deficits. 
The policies to tackle these 
macroeconomic distortions 
created additional distortions. 
Administered interest rates, 
given high inflation, resulted 
in negative interest rates, 
which discouraged domestic 
savings, favoured over-
investment in low-priority 
projects and encouraged 
capital flight. Price control 
regulations on producers and 
export bans reduced profits 
and the incentives to produce, 
leading to shortages of 
essential commodities. Also, 
the use of all kinds of 
administrative controls to 
restrict imports, such as 
import licensing, stringent 
exchange controls, 
imposition of prohibitive 
tariffs or import bans only 
served to increase effective 
protection of inefficient 
import-substituting 
industries.  
 Political Instability, which 
was created by the abrupt 
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leadership changes, through 
military coups between 1966 
and 1998, heightened 
uncertainty and country risk 
and discouraged domestic 
and foreign investments. 
 Delayed democratisation. As 
democracy builds a large 
constituency to demand the 
implementation of good 
policies, the delay in 
returning the country to  
democratic governance after 
the military coup of 1966 
contributed to insufficient 
diversification of the 
Nigerian economy. Delayed 
democratization stalled quick 
decentralization of decision-
making, allowed the 
emasculation o f organisd 
labour (through the 
imposition of a regime of low 
wages and the muzzling of 
trade unions) and the 
continuation of human rights 
abuses. Human rights abuses 
made Nigeria ineligible for 
most aid from the 
Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) member 
countries and dampened 
private investors‘ confidence 
and enthusiasm in the 
economy.  
 
5. Government Policies to 
Restructure the Economy 
According to Camdessus (1990), a 
successful economic restructuring 
programme would seek to achieve 
macroeconomic stability, structural 
reforms that would establish an 
appropriately decentralized system 
of decision making and 
responsibility, and an effective 
pattern of incentives to work, to 
save, and to invest. In addition, set 
up a regulatory framework to 
supervise and maintain the market 
infrastructure and to decide delicate 
and complex distributional issues; 
and, social security system to 
cushion the impact of adverse 
economic situation on the most 
vulnerable groups in the society.  
 
The most radical attempt to 
restructure the Nigerian economy 
was the launching of the Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 
1986. The objectives of SAP, 
according to the Central Bank of 
Nigeria (1986) are to:  restructure 
and diversify the productive base of 
the economy, achieve fiscal and 
balance of payments viability; reduce 
the dominance of unproductive 
investments in the public sector, and 
lay the basis for sustainable non-
inflationary growth. However, the 
success of the structural adjustment 
programme in addressing the extant 
fundamental problems of the 
economy is quite minimal, besides, it 
brought other problems 
(Obadan,2003) 
The policies pursued over the years 
in Nigeria to achieve economic 
restructuring have resulted in the 
following outcomes: 
 Massive devaluation of the 
naira 
 Minimal debt reliefs, in the 
form of debt rescheduling 
agreements with creditors 
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between 1986 and 2005 and 
thereafter in 2006/2007 a 
major debt relief after a debt 
buy-back. 
 The establishment of the 
Nigerian Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (NDIC) in 1988 
to handle the increased risks 
of bank failure following the 
deregulation of the banking 
system in 1987.  
 The pursuit of export 
promotion programmes 
through such schemes as the 
Nigerian Economic 
Recovery Fund 
(NERFUND) to disburse 
export stimulation loans 
from the World Bank and the 
African Development Bank 
(AfDB) to SMEs, the 
establishment of the 
Nigerian Export-import 
Bank (EXIM) in 1990 and 
Export Processing Zones 
(EPZs) in the 1990s. 
 Providing cheap and long-
term financing for industrial 
projects through the 
establishment of 
Development Finance 
Institutions (DFIs), such as 
the Nigerian Industrial 
Development Bank (NIDB) 
in 1964, the Small Scale 
Industrial Credit Scheme 
(SSICS) in 1971, the 
Nigerian Bank for Commerce 
and Industry (NBCI) and the 
Nigerian Agricultural and 
Cooperative Bank (NACB) in 
1973, the Peoples Bank in 
1989, the Community Banks 
in 1990 and the Family 
Economic Advancement 
Programme (FEAP) in 1997.  
 The common objectives of 
these DFIs include: Mobilise 
and channel domestic savings 
to profitable investment 
opportunities. Provide 
medium and long-term loans 
as well as guarantee loans 
from foreign sources. 
Receive foreign and 
international loans for on-
lending to local enterprises. 
Provision of short-term 
advances and other 
commercial banking 
activities to disadvantaged 
groups. Provision of training 
and financial advisory 
services.  
 The shortcomings of these 
credit and advisory services 
to the industrialists and 
entrepreneurs through the 
DFIs and other government-
supported arrangements 
were: They were financed by 
annual subscriptions from the 
treasury. They were subject 
to the budget, accounting and 
audit controls applicable to 
other government 
departments. The permanent 
staff were civil servants and 
the methods of 
recruitment/conditions of 
service were similar to civil 
service. The DFIs were 
usually organized as 
divisions or major divisions 
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of one of the governmental 
departments. Obtained 
funding in form of loans at 
concessionary rates from 
government or from 
international capital market 
backed by government 
guarantees without 
accompanying 
responsibilities. Inadequate 
capitalization of the 
institutions. Financial 
repression policies with 
respect to commercial banks. 
Policy reversals. 
 Use of directed credit, where 
government specified the 
proportion of commercial 
banks‘ credit that would go 
to certain preferred sectors. 
 Promotion of small and 
medium-scale enterprises 
(SMEs). Informed by the 
colossal failure of big ISI 
enterprises and drawing from 
the transformative roles of 
SMEs in other countries, both 
industrialized and emerging, 
government undertook the 
promotion of SMEs in 
Nigeria. SMEs in Nigeria 
refer to enterprises with a 
minimum asset base of 
N300million (excluding land 
and working capital) and an 
employment size of between 
10 and 300 workers. The 
major features of SMEs that 
recommend them for Nigeria 
include the following: They 
provide the environment for 
the development of 
indigenous entrepreneurial, 
technical and marketing 
skills. They serve as 
important source of raw 
materials and intermediate 
inputs for large-scale 
industries. They serve as a 
major vehicle for 
mobilization of savings and 
domestic capital formation. 
They use highly labour-
intensive technologies. They 
act as catalysts for market 
competition because of the 
ease of entry and exit in the 
sub sector.  
 Despite these unassailable 
arguments for promoting 
SMEs in Nigeria their record 
of performance has been 
dismal, for the following 
reasons: Undercapitalization. 
High import dependency and 
vulnerability to the vagaries 
of the international market.  
High mortality, arising from 
mismanagement, which is a 
function of pronounced 
dearth of technical, 
entrepreneurial and 
marketing skills. Lack of 
enabling environment for 
business success, arising 
from inconsistent government 
policies, inadequate 
infrastructure supply, and 
inadequate supply of business 
information. Restricted 
access to institutional credit 
and poor creditor protection 
rights. 
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 The transfer of formerly 
publicly owned enterprises to 
the private sector, with mixed 
success stories. While some 
have survived, others have 
gone under. 
 The continued domination by 
the government of very 
critical enterprises and 
sectors, such as power, oil 
and gas, education, 
healthcare, railways and other 
infrastructure provision.  
 
6.0 Promising Opportunities in the 
Non-Oil Sector 
Drawing from the objectives of the 
failed Nigerian development plans, 
the current infrastructure supply 
deficiency in Nigeria and 
developments in the global economy, 
the following sectors appear most 
promising for developing a dominant 
non-oil economy: 
 Downstream oil and gas. 
Petroleum refining easily 
stands out as the most 
promising segment of the oil 
and gas sector for private 
sector investments. There are 
presently four government-
owned petroleum refineries, 
which are unable to supply 
the domestic refined 
petroleum requirements. The 
inappropriateness of 
government management of 
these refineries is evident in 
their frequent breakdowns 
and the incessant industrial 
unrests by workers in the oil 
sector, resulting in 
bottlenecks in the supply of 
petroleum products across the 
country. Domestic refining of 
domestically consumed 
petroleum products is one 
way of increasing the 
national content in the oil and 
gas sector, ensuring smooth 
internal flows of petroleum 
products and saving foreign 
exchange on refined 
petroleum products 
importation. Nigeria could 
also earn foreign exchange 
from the export of refined 
petroleum products. As a 
matter of fact, one of the 
existing refineries, that was 
commissioned in 1989, was 
conceived as an export 
refinery but it failed to 
produce for export. There is 
also the production of gas for 
industrial and household 
uses. There is as yet very 
minimal national investment 
in this area in the laying of 
the pipelines. Limited 
domestic refining capacity 
means that other products 
that are bye-products of 
petroleum refining and that 
can serve as industrial inputs 
are under produced. 
 Agriculture and agro-allied 
manufacturing. Nigeria needs 
to return to its leading 
position in the export of 
cocoa, palm produce, ground 
nuts and rubber. The output 
of cocoa, for instance, fell 
from about 365,000 metric 
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tones in the 1950s to less than 
240,000 metric tones in 2007. 
Domestic production of palm 
produce (palm oil and palm 
kernels) and ground nuts do 
not meet domestic demand 
for them. In fact, government 
was forced to lift the 
prohibition on imports of 
palm oil recently. Two major 
traded staples, rice and 
maize, also experience 
insufficient domestic 
production. Other major 
staples that are not normal 
items of international trade, 
such as beans, yam and 
cassava, are also not 
produced in adequate 
quantities to meet domestic 
requirements. Many factors 
explain the low productivity 
of Nigerian agriculture, 
including the dominance of 
production by subsistent 
peasant producers using 
traditional technology and 
low-yielding varieties of 
seedlings, dependent on the 
seasons for production, and 
having uneconomic farm 
sizes. There are few large-
scale production units in 
Nigerian agriculture and 
since these provide adequate 
scope for reaping scale 
economies in production they 
point the way for future 
development of agriculture in 
Nigeria. The Kwara State 
government gave a big boost 
to commercial agriculture 
when it invited some of the 
displaced commercial 
farmers in Zimbabwe to 
establish commercial farms 
in that state. Agro-allied 
manufacturing to process the 
products of the commercial 
farms represents another 
advance in this direction.    
 Manufacturing. The 
manufacturing sector in 
Nigeria has failed to grow 
beyond the ―infant industry‖ 
stage, mainly because of lack 
of innovation in products and 
processes. None of the IS 
industries has been able to 
meet total domestic demand 
for their products. Despite the 
typically small size of plants 
at inception, the existence of 
high excess capacity due to 
high operating costs (high 
costs of raw materials, spare 
parts and machinery) 
threatens the viability of the 
enterprises. Many firms have 
closed down in the textile, 
tyre making, battery 
manufacture, shoe-making 
sub-sectors, amongst others. 
Efforts in the 
intermediate/capital goods 
manufacturing sub sector had 
been a colossal failure. There 
is no doubt that inadequate 
technical and managerial 
skills and the absence of 
indigenous technological 
base are additional factors 
responsible for the comatose 
state of Nigerian 
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manufacturing. In the mean 
time, a manufacturing sector 
based on the processing of 
agricultural and solid mineral 
resources will be in a better 
position to overcome the 
inadequacies of the Nigerian 
manufacturing sector.  
 Banking and financial 
services. Banking and other 
financial services (mainly 
insurance) came to Nigeria 
through foreign investment 
but along the line, indigenous 
investors joined the sector 
and have taken over. 
Financial repression policies 
pursued by the government 
over the years did much 
damage to the growth of the 
banking /financial services 
sector but things changed for 
the better with the banking 
/financial sector 
consolidation of 2004-2007. 
The banking sector 
consolidation required banks 
to have a minimum capital 
base of N25 billion by 
December 2005, up from 
N2billion in 2004 while the 
minimum capital for 
insurance companies became 
N2 billion for general, N3 
billion for life, N5billion for 
composite and N10billion for 
reinsurance. Since then, 
Nigerian banks and insurance 
companies have grown and 
some have become strong 
regional, continental and 
global players and the 
financial sector has become 
well positioned to undertake 
big-ticket transactions. While 
global expansion is desirable 
as a way of reversing trade 
deficits in the current 
accounts of Nigeria‘s balance 
of payments, many indices 
still point to the fact that 
Nigeria is still under banked. 
One of these is the high level 
of interest rates in the 
country, which mirrors the 
inefficiency in financial 
intermediation. This has been 
cited as one major reason 
why the banking sector has 
not facilitated the 
expansion/development of 
the non-oil sector as it 
should. High interest rates 
mean that only the most 
promising of projects could 
be funded with bank loans, 
which being short-term in 
nature may not match the 
gestation period of most 
industrial projects. There 
were recent instances of high 
profile industrial enterprises 
that were nearly crippled by 
the burden of high interest 
cost on borrowed funds for 
expansion. High interest rates 
also contribute to high cost of 
domestic products, making 
them uncompetitive both in 
the domestic and foreign 
markets. 
 Telecommunications. Until 
2001, the 
telecommunications sector in 
35 
                 Covenant Journal of Business and Social Sciences (CJBSS) Vol. 5, No. 1, June, 2013. 
 
Nigeria was under a 
government monopoly, with 
very limited access, high cost 
and unreliable services. The 
deregulation of the sector 
started in 2001 with the 
auctioning of the Generalised 
System of Mobile 
Telecommunications (GSM) 
licences to three private 
sector enterprises, which 
were shielded from new 
competition until after six 
years.  Since the expiration of 
this exclusivity period, new 
entrants have been licensed 
and telephone density has 
grown in a way unimaginable 
prior to 2001. The greatly 
improved access to 
telecommunications services, 
reduced cost due to 
competition, and greater 
reliability of services has 
enhanced the volume, variety 
and quality of 
services/production where 
telecommunications services 
comprise production inputs. 
It has also encouraged 
innovations in products in the 
services sector of banking, 
insurance, healthcare, 
education and public 
administration. It is 
instructive to note that the 
former government 
monopoly in the sector has 
been unable to compete and 
has died, defying even a 
privatization. 
Notwithstanding the giant 
strides in the sector, 
considerable investment gaps 
remain in the provision of 
data transmission and other 
services to improve internet 
access by Nigerians, which in 
the information age would 
spur further economic 
growth. 
 Transportation services 
(road/railways, shipping and 
aviation). It is common 
knowledge that bulk goods 
transportation over land is 
considerably less costly using 
the railways. But in Nigeria, 
the inability to modernize the 
railways, maladministration, 
due to public ownership, and 
inadequate funding stalled 
the efficient operation of the 
railway. The West-North and 
the East North lines 
effectively stopped running 
in the mid 1980s. Since then, 
there has been enormous 
pressure on the roads, for 
both bulk and passenger 
transport over long distances. 
The use of high-energy 
consumption, lower freight 
and passenger capacity 
vehicles on road transport has 
greatly increased 
transportation costs, 
contributing to the un-
competitiveness of Nigerian 
products. The high cost of 
domestic transportation on 
roads is also a result of the 
limited domestic technology 
inputs in the sector, save the 
49 
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maintenance provided by 
auto technicians. The truck 
and passenger vehicle 
assembly plants set up in the 
late 1970s/early 1980s have 
either closed down or are 
continuing in unproductive 
operations. The implication 
of this is that the 
trucks/passenger vehicles 
used for road transport in 
Nigeria are virtually all 
imported. The aviation 
business in Nigeria is also 
yearning for more 
investment. The defunct 
Nigerian Airways had 
monopoly of domestic routes 
in the 1970s/early 1980s and 
competed with foreign 
airlines for foreign passenger 
traffic in and out of Nigeria. 
From the second half of the 
1980s, the Nigerian Airways 
began to die and private 
domestic operators gradually 
took over its operations. 
However, due to the high 
capital intensity of the 
business and its high 
technical skills intensity, the 
poorly capitalized private 
operators with limited 
technical know-how, could 
not make much headway in 
the business. Many of the 
early entrants in the sector 
closed shop soon after set up 
while new operators have 
emerged. Despite increasing 
the minimum capital base for 
airline operators, existing 
firms have not attained the 
scale required for efficient 
operations. Nigeria‘s share of 
incoming/outgoing 
cargo/passenger traffic is still 
very minimal and the 
domestic market is still not 
adequately served because 
passenger volumes is still 
very low in relation to 
potential traffic due to high 
cost of air travels. As the 
aviation sector‘s contribution 
to African GDP is about 
US$10billion, we could 
expect aviation potential 
contribution to Nigeria‘s 
GDP to be at least 
US$3billion given that 
passenger volumes in Nigeria 
come only behind those of 
South Africa and Egypt, 
Indigenous shipping business 
is till in its infancy in Nigeria 
and we need investments in 
this sector to begin to take 
our own share of global 
shipping income.  
 Human capital development. 
The bane of development in 
Nigeria has been poor human 
capital development. All the 
development plans had 
complained of inadequate 
executive capacity. In order 
to correct this, the different 
tiers of government have 
embarked on massive 
expansion of the educational 
sector. But due to poor 
attention to basic inputs in 
the education process, like 
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quality teachers, teaching 
materials, incentive 
considerations, cost sharing, 
ownership of institutions, and 
quality assurance, through 
appropriate regulation and 
inspection, Nigeria has 
increased the quantity but the 
not the quality of the outputs 
of the educational system. 
Even at this, there is still high 
demand for enrolment at the 
various tiers of the 
educational system. Judging 
from the widespread poor 
funding of institutions, the 
public sector appears to have 
reached its optimum 
participation level in terms of 
the ownership of educational 
institutions. This suggests 
that future expansion must be 
private sector driven. In this 
regard, however, the most 
promising avenues for 
expansion appear to be in 
secondary and tertiary 
education, where public 
schools still dominate. Given 
the existing levels of 
enrolment in these 
institutions, there should be 
at least as many privately 
owned private secondary and 
tertiary institutions in 
Nigeria, as there are public 
institutions of that nature. 
Presently, 34 of the 94 
universities in Nigeria are 
privately owned. A halt in 
expansion of schools at the 
secondary/tertiary level 
allows the government to 
focus on upgrading the 
quality of its existing schools 
while further expansion by 
the private sector in this sub 
sector increases competition 
among private schools while 
expanding access to such 
schools. Available data 
suggests that not up to 30% 
of the over one million 
candidates that seek 
university admissions every 
year succeed. Apart from 
meeting domestic manpower 
requirements, quality 
education system in Nigeria 
would also provide labour 
with appropriate skills for 
globalised market. As 
production of quality human 
capital is still a labour-
intensive enterprise, Nigeria 
has comparative advantage in 
this and success here would 
increase our foreign 
exchange earnings through 
the remittance of labour 
incomes. As a result of 
producing the wrong type o f 
skills, Nigerian organizations 
and agencies spend at least 
N2.5 billion every year to 
buy and maintain computer 
software from abroad.  The 
educational system needs to 
restructure to provide the 
skilled manpower to develop 
ICT infrastructure in Nigeria.   
 Healthcare services. Good 
healthcare services are 
essential to support a 
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productive labour force. 
There is still high incidence 
of preventable diseases while 
the mortality rate arising 
from simple diseases is still 
very high, all pointing to the 
limited coverage of Nigeria‘s 
healthcare system, the 
ineffectiveness of existing 
healthcare and the 
inefficiency of the system. 
Quite apart from the issue of 
facilities, personnel and 
organization, a very sore 
point is the high dependence 
of the sector on imported 
drugs, mirroring the dismal 
performance of Nigeria‘s 
pharmaceutical industry. One 
adverse effect of this is the 
high incidence of fake and 
adulterated drugs, which are 
imported from different parts 
of the world. Sadly, one 
major fallout of the poor 
business environment in the 
country has been the 
divesting from Nigeria of  
global pharmaceutical giants 
like Pfizer. The inadequacy 
of the healthcare system is 
further shown in the high 
incidence of overseas 
medical treatment for less 
complex diseases. These 
show that there is still 
considerable scope for 
private investment in the 
healthcare sector in Nigeria 
in order to support a vibrant 
labour force, thereby 
increasing productivity, 
reducing foreign exchange 
incurred in overseas medical 
treatment, and also earning 
foreign exchange from the 
export of medical services.    
 Tourism. This is another 
sector where the potentials of 
the economy are far from 
being exploited, for a variety 
of reasons including lack of 
supportive infrastructure, 
insecurity of lives and 
property, limited tourism 
sites and the poor image of 
the country internationally. 
Apart from the basic 
infrastructure such as 
adequate supply of power and 
water, good 
telecommunications, and 
good transportation system, 
tourism development also 
requires adequate supply of 
standard hotels, a highly 
hospitable populace, well 
developed financial system, a 
good healthcare system, a 
diversity of formalized 
cultural events and the 
existence of functional duty-
free shops. Empirical 
evidences clearly indicate 
that on many of these, the 
country still rank poorly.  
 
7.0 Policy Recommendation 
The development of the non-oil 
sector or the diversification of the 
economy has long been pursued as a 
development goal. Unfortunately, 
policies introduced to achieve this 
goal have not succeeded due to 
several lapses. Given the abundance 
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of many promising sectors for viable 
private and public-sector 
investments, we recommend the 
following measures to catalyse the 
development of the non-oil sector: 
 The synchronization of fiscal 
and monetary policies of the 
government in order to 
ensure macroeconomic 
stability and prevent recourse 
to extreme economic policies 
that distort incentives for 
profitable economic 
activities. 
 Massive investments at all 
levels of government to 
upgrade regulatory capacity 
in all major markets/sectors 
of the economy to assure 
certainty of rules, full 
compliance by businesses 
with regulations and fair 
competition. 
 Devising a commercial 
model of operation for 
publicly sponsored business 
intervention agencies as the 
public operating model 
hitherto used has woefully 
failed. 
 Widespread use of the public-
private partnerships (PPPs) 
scheme in providing basic 
infrastructure like power 
supply, water, transportation 
facilities and security. 
 The re-organisation of 
Nigerian agriculture to 
encourage the emergence of 
large-scale production units 
that would leverage on 
modern technology and high-
yielding seedlings to increase 
productivity. 
 Redirection of 
industrialization strategy 
away from import 
substitution to export-
promotion, based on the 
processing of agricultural and 
solid mineral products. 
 Guided deregulation of 
strategic sectors such as 
power, oil and gas, aviation, 
rail services, etc. 
 The revitalization and 
modernization of railway 
services, which stopped 
operations in the mid-
80s/early 1990s. 
 Improved efficiency in 
financial intermediation to 
reduce the high level of 
interest rates in the economy 
and increase the level of 
domestic savings. 
 Improvement in the quality of 
the educational system to 
provide the basic skills and 
knowledge to power the 
domestic economy and 
enable it profit from 
economic globalisation. In 
this regard, the public sector 
in Nigeria should transit from 
ownership to effective 
regulation of educational 
institutions. 
 Strengthening of creditor 
rights in our legal framework 
so that creditors could easily 
foreclose collaterals pledged 
for loans in instances of 
default. 
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Figure 1:  Oil & Non-Oil 
Contributions To Government 
Revenues (1961 -2009) 
Oil Revenues
Non-Oil Revenues
Total Fedral
Revenues
 
 
Year Oil Non-Oil 
1960 – 64* 34.16 332.2 
1965 – 69* 160.16 369.58 
1970 – 74* 1979.6 357.68 
1975 – 79* 6705.18 536.52 
1980 13,632.3 554.4 
1981 10,680.5 342.8 
1982 8,003.2 203.2 
1983 7,201.2 301.3 
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1984 8,840.6 247.4 
1985 11,223.7 497.1 
1986 8,368.5 552.1 
1987 28,208.6 2,152.0 
1988 28,453.4 2,757.4 
1989 55,016.8 2,954.4 
1990 106,626.5 3,259.6 
1991 116,858.1 4,677.3 
1992 201,383.9 4,227.8 
1993 213,778.8 4,991.3 
1994 200,710.2 5,349.0 
1995 927,565.3 23,096.1 
1996 1,286,215.9 23,327.5 
1997 1,212,499.4 29,153.3 
1998 717,786.5 34,070.2 
1999 1,169,476.9 19,492.9 
2000 1,920,900.4 24,822.9 
2001 1,839,945.3 28,008.6 
2002 1,649,445.8 94,731.8 
2003 2,993,110.0 94,776.4 
2004 4,489,472.2 113,309.4 
2005 7,140,578.9 105,955.9 
2006 7,181,085.6 133,595.0 
2007 8,110,500.4 199,257.9 
2008 9,659,772.6 247,839.0 
2009 8,543,261.2 289,152.6 
2010 10,639,417.4 396,377.2 
2011 13,746,207.09 485,243.54 
 
Table 2: Nominal Value of Nigerian Oil & Non-oil Exports during the 
Period 1960 - 2011   (in million Naira) 
Sources:    (1) Central Bank of Nigeria (2011) Annual Report 
  (2) Central Bank of Nigeria (2008), Statistical Bulletin 
             (3)National Bureau of Statistics (2009) 
            * = Average for 5-year period 
 
Year External Reserves Foreign Debt Stock 
1960 -64* 208.09 79.3 
1965 - 69* 149.79 128.82 
1970 – 74*  902.36 243.68 
1975 – 79* 2808.64 790.64 
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1980 5,462 1,866.8 
1981 2,442 2,331.2 
1982 1,043 8,819.4 
1983 224 10,577.7 
1984 710 14,808.7 
1985 1,658 17,300.6 
1986 2,837 41,452.4 
1987 7,505 100,789.1 
1988 5,229 133,956.3 
1989 3,048 240,393.7 
1990 4,542 298,614.4 
1991 4,149 328,453.8 
1992 1,555 544,264.1 
1993 1,430 633,144.4 
1994 9,009 648,813.0 
1995 1,611 716,865.6 
1996 3,404 617,320.0 
1997 7,222 595,931.9 
1998 7,108 633,017.0 
1999 5,425 2,577,374.4 
2000 9,386 3,097,383.9 
2001 10,267 3,176,291.0 
2002 7,681 3,932,884.8 
2003 7,468 4,478,329.3 
2004 16,955 4,890,269.6 
2005 28,279 2,695,072.2 
2006 42,298 451,461.7 
2007 51,333 431,079.8 
2008 53,000 493,180.2 
2009 42,383 590,441.1 
2010 32,339 689,845.3 
2011 32,600 896,800.0 
 
Table 1: External Reserves, Foreign Debt Stock & Debt Relief of Federal 
Government of Nigeria as at Fiscal Year End (in million Naira) 
Sources: Computed from:(1) Central Bank of Nigeria (2011), Annual Report 
         (2) Central Bank of Nigeria (2008), Statistical Bulletin 
         (3)National Bureau of Statistics (2009) 
* = Average for 5-year period. 
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